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The Illegality of Resentencing
Quin M. Sorenson1
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker2 that man-
datory application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines was
inherently unconstitutional.' It responded by erasing from the
Sentencing Reform Act4 all provisions that required adherence to
the Guidelines and by directing that cases on direct appeal be re-
manded to district courts for resentencing under an advisory
Guidelines regime.' Through this whitewash of the United States
Code, the Court believed that the federal sentencing structure
could be constitutionally preserved.
Unfortunately, it missed a spot. Another provision of federal
law, overlooked in Booker and in hundreds of subsequent appel-
late cases, still obliges district judges to adhere to the Guidelines
when resentencing a defendant on remand from a court of appeals.
These judges are put in an unenviable Catch-22: follow Booker
and resentence under an advisory scheme or follow the statute
and resentence under a mandatory scheme. Whatever choice they
make, the resulting sentence will be illegal, in violation of either
the United States Constitution or the United States Code.
This article will offer, in Parts I and II, a brief overview of fed-
eral sentencing law and the decision in Booker. It will then ad-
dress, in Parts II and III, the illegality of resentencing under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2). The article concludes, in Parts IV and V, by
explaining that, although none of the sentences imposed on re-
mand after Booker has been legal, none of them should be over-
turned.
1. Law Clerk, The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit; J.D., summa cum laude, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsyl-
vania State University (2003).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. Booker, 543 U.S. at 242.
4. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
5. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258, 268.
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I.
The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted in 1984 as a means to
promote consistency and uniformity in sentencing.' Prior to the
Act, federal judges had operated in a largely indeterminate sen-
tencing world, in which their discretion to impose a particular sen-
tence, although confined by the broad ranges established in the
United States Code, was otherwise unfettered.! The result, at
least as perceived by many legislators, was wildly disparate sen-
tences for similarly situated criminals, depending wholly upon the
philosophy and mood of the judges before whom they appeared.8
The Act sought to reign in these vagaries by imposing a structured
regime under which judicial sentencing discretion would be chan-
neled through a series of defined policies and practices.9
These policies took the form of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, issued by the United States Sentencing Commission in
1987.10 The Guidelines offer a series of detailed instructions by
which judges can determine the appropriate sentence "range" for a
defendant by reference to the particular circumstances surround-
ing the offense.11 They provide a base "offense level" for crimes
6. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39, 59 (1983).
7. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); KATE STITH & Jose A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-37
(1998); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973); Frank
0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 300-05 (2000); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for
Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1358-61 (1999) (reviewing STITH & CABRANES,
supra).
8. E.g., S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1983) ("The shameful disparity in criminal sen-
tences is a major flaw in the existing criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the
system is ripe for reform."); 130 CONG. REC. 1644 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(characterizing sentencing disparities as a "national disgrace"); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 365 ("Serious disparities in sentences... were common."); Nancy J. King & Susan R.
Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 316, 328 n.62 (2004) ("Disparate sentences for
similarly situated defendants were based primarily upon geography, race, gender, and
judicial philosophy."). A compelling challenge to this perception is presented in STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 7, at 31-32, 106-12.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1983); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 367-68; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 2-3. For a comprehensive review of the
legislative background of the Sentencing Reform Act, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
10. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 1, pt. A (2004); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 994; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 2-3.
11. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 1, pt. A; Bowman, supra note 7, at 305
("The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, in a sense, simply a long set of instructions for
one chart - the Sentencing Table.") (footnote omitted); cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7,
at 3 (noting that the Guidelines Manual consists of "more than nine hundred pages of tech-
nical regulations and amendments, weighing close to five pounds - which may be usefully
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under the United States Code and a "criminal history category" for
the defendant reflecting his or her prior convictions." The judge is
then directed to make a number of other factual findings, relating
to offense and offender characteristics, that raise or lower the base
offense level and criminal history category. 3 Once these adjust-
ments are complete, the judge consults a sentencing table to de-
termine the recommended term of imprisonment, expressed as a
minimum and maximum number of months.'4
Despite their title, the "Guidelines" were undoubtedly manda-
tory.15 The Sentencing Reform Act required judges to apply the
Guidelines and to impose a sentence within the range prescribed
therein.'6 Only if the judge concluded on the record that other cir-
cumstances, "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission," strongly militated in favor of a different
sentence could he or she depart from the recommended range."
These "departures," although recognized in the statute, were
strictly regulated by the Commission and, in practice, were rarely
available.'8 With few exceptions, the range prescribed by the
compared to, for example, the Internal Revenue Code, which weighs in at just under four
pounds") (footnote omitted).
12. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 1, pt. A; Bowman, supra note 7, at
305-06; M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The
Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 540-
44(2005).
13. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.1; Bowman, supra note 7, at 305-
06; Darmer, supra note 12, at 540-44.
14. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 5, pt. A; cf UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5E 1.2(c)(3) (providing ranges of fines for various offense levels).
Other commentators have offered more technical descriptions of the sentencing table:
The sentencing table is a two-dimensional grid which measures the seriousness
of the current offense on its vertical axis and the defendant's criminal history
on its horizontal axis. The goal of guidelines calculations is to determine an of-
fense level and a criminal history category, which together generate an inter-
section in the body of the grid. Each intersection designates a sentencing range
expressed in months.... The... sentencing table ... has 43 offense levels, 6
criminal history categories, and 258 sentencing range boxes.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1324-25 (2005). For a lengthier discussion of the
Guidelines by one of their authors, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
15. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 2 ("Despite the use of the term guidelines, the
sentencing rules issued by the Sentencing Commission are binding on the federal judici-
ary.").
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see infra note 53 (quoting statute).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 975-76 (9th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510-12 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 543 U.S.
220(2005).
18. Booker, 543 U.S. at 223; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 145-47; Mi-
chael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical
213
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Guidelines marked the absolute bounds of the district court's sen-
tencing discretion.'9
Subsequent legislation offered even more restrictions. Most no-
table for these purposes is the PROTECT Act of 2003,20 particu-
larly those provisions known as the "Feeney Amendment."" The
Feeney Amendment, in addition to implementing de novo appel-
late review for all departures,22 reaffirmed the obligation of district
courts to adhere to the Guidelines in cases remanded from courts
of appeals:
A district court to which a case is remanded. . . shall not
impose a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range
except upon a ground that -
(A) was specifically and affirmatively included in the
[district court's] written statement of reasons... in
connection with the previous sentencing of the de-
fendant prior to the appeal; and
(B) was held by the court of appeals, in remanding
the case, to be a permissible ground of departure.23
This provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), eliminated in
cases on remand what little discretion a district court had previ-
ously enjoyed to impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines
range.
24
and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 353, 364 (1996); cf UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0 cmt. n.3 ("[I]nasmuch as the Commission has continued
to monitor and refine the guidelines since their inception... it is expected that departures
based on the weight accorded to any such circumstance will occur rarely and only in excep-
tional cases.").
19. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 2-3, 31-32, 106-12, 145-47; Bowman, supra
note 7, at 308; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 223; Ameline, 376 F.3d at 975-76; Booker, 375
F.3d at 510-12.
20. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
21. Id. § 401; H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 58 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). For the legislative back-
ground of the Act, see, for example, Mark Osler, Uniformity and Traditional Sentencing
Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SEN'G REP. 253 (2004).
22. PROTECT Act § 401 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)); see also infra note 54 (quoting
statute).
23. PROTECT Act § 401.
24. United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 852-53 (5th Cir. 2004) ("ITlhe plain lan-
guage of § 3742(g) appears to handcuff any court on remand... ."); see, e.g., United States
v. Kostakis, 364 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2004); Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing
Law, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 310, 313-14 (2003).
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Judges and commentators denounced these provisions.2  They
argued that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Feeney Amend-
ment swung the balance too far in favor of mechanistic and de-
terministic sentencing and away from individualized consideration
of retributive and rehabilitative needs.26 Nevertheless, courts had
little choice but to follow congressional commands and adhere
strictly to the Guidelines.27
II.
That is, until Booker. Following Booker it became clear that
mandatory application of the Guidelines is questionable not only
from a policy standpoint, but from a constitutional one as well.2"
The right to a jury trial, embodied in the Sixth Amendment,29
guarantees that a defendant will suffer no greater punishment
upon conviction than that which is authorized by the legislature
based solely on the facts found by a jury.3" In other words, the
maximum sentence that a judge may constitutionally impose is
that permitted exclusively by the jury's verdict or the defendant's
admissions; the judge cannot rely on his or her own findings to
25. E.g., Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme
Court, to Congress (Apr. 5, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 307, 345 (2003); see also
Vinegrad, supra note 24, at 313-14. The controversy that erupted over the Feeney
Amendment has been detailed in numerous other articles. See generally Osler, supra note
21; Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, "Don't Think Twice, It's All Right": Remands, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines & the Protect Act - A Radical 'Departure"?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527
(2004); Vinegrad, supra note 24; Mark T. Bailey, Note, Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate
Courts Should Review Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference,
90 IowA L. REV. 269 (2004).
26. E.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 2-3, 31-32, 106-12, 145-47; see also
Wright, supra note 7, at 1355 ("Federal sentencing experienced a revolution fifteen years
ago, and many are now convinced that this revolution has become a Reign of Terror.").
27. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (fol-
lowing the Feeney Amendment but describing it as "much-criticized" and "unsound").
28. Some lower courts had previously recognized, based on prior decisions of the Su-
preme Court, that the Guidelines system could not pass constitutional muster. See, e.g.,
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510-12 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 343 U.S. 220 (2005). A
comprehensive jurisprudential history of Booker is, of course, outside the scope of this arti-
cle. For a good treatment on the subject, see Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v.
Wilbur: United States v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative
Power To Define Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393 (2005), or any number of other academic and
judicial sources, see, e.g., United States v. Johns, 336 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417-21 (M.D. Pa.
2004); Darmer, supra note 12.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
30. Booker, 343 U.S. at 230 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995));




justify a higher sentence." Any fact that increases the maximum
punishment to which the defendant is exposed must be submitted
to a jury or admitted by the defendant.
This principle took center stage in Booker. The defendant in
Booker had pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute at
least fifty grams of cocaine base." This offense carried a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841,"' but the base
range prescribed by the Guidelines, premised solely on the offense
level for the crime of conviction, was 210 to 262 months. 5 During
a sentencing hearing, the trial judge determined that the defen-
dant had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had ob-
structed justice, increasing the Guidelines imprisonment range to
360 months to life.3" The judge imposed a sentence of thirty years
imprisonment.37
The Supreme Court reversed. Its decision was premised upon
the rule that a defendant may suffer no greater punishment than
that which is authorized by the verdict of the jury.3" The maxi-
mum sentence that the district court could have imposed on the
defendant in Booker, based solely on the offense of conviction, was
262 months, the maximum of the Guidelines base range.39 Any
facts raising this range would increase the maximum punishment
to which the defendant was exposed and would therefore implicate
the right to a jury trial.4 ° Yet, the district court had based its final
sentence of thirty years on facts found by the judge, without sub-
mission to a jury or admission by the defendant.4' Reliance on
31. Booker, 54 U.S. at 231-38 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); see also Blakely, 542
U.S. at 303 ("Mhe relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any addi-
tional findings.").
32. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-91. To allow a judge to impose punishment for conduct
that was not submitted to a jury would, in the words of Justice Scalia, render trial "a mere
preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to
punish." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
33. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(a)(iii), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
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these facts to increase the base range under the Guidelines vio-
lated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment.42
This exposed not only the illegality of the defendant's sentence,
but the constitutional infirmity of the entire federal sentencing
system." There is no provision in the Guidelines for a jury to
make findings of fact relevant to the recommended sentencing
range." Instead, the Guidelines contemplate that these facts will
be found by a judge based on information presented during a post-
trial hearing.45 These facts will increase the sentencing range,
but, since they are not submitted to the jury or admitted by the
defendant, they cannot constitutionally be relied upon to increase
the final sentence.46 The sentencing process dictated by the Guide-
lines is thus inherently incompatible with the one required by the
Sixth Amendment.47
The Court recognized that the constitutional problem was
traceable to the mandatory nature of the Guidelines.48 The right to
a jury trial attaches to facts relevant to the Guidelines only be-
cause those facts restrict the sentencing authority of the district
court: unless the judge makes these findings, he or she may not
impose a sentence higher than the base range.49 If the district
court was not bound by the Guidelines range - if the Guidelines
merely advised the district court as to the appropriate sentence
42. Id. (characterizing the problem as that "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize
the sentence[; rather, the] judge acquires that authority only upon finding some additional
fact") (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004)).
43. Id. at 240, 247-48.
44. Id. at 240.
45. Id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3) (providing that "the court" must resolve disputed
matters at sentencing); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 ("In deter-
mining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the
guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information con-
cerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohib-
ited by law."); id. § 6A1.3(a) ("In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the informa-
tion has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy."); cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661 ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, char-
acter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.").
46. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-241 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
47. Id. at 240, 258.
48. Id. The Booker opinion was authored in two parts by two Justices. The first part,
holding that sentencing enhancements under a mandatory Guidelines regime based on
facts not submitted to a jury violate the rights recognized in Apprendi, was authored by
Justice Stevens. Id. at 225-45. The second part, addressing the remedy for the violation,
was authored by Justice Breyer. Id. at 245-68. The swing vote was Justice Ginsburg.
49. Id. at 260.
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without actually limiting its authority - then facts relevant to the
Guidelines would no longer increase the maximum punishment to
which the defendant is exposed and would no longer implicate the
right to a jury trial.0 A district court could then apply the Guide-
lines as they were intended, increasing the recommended range
based on judicial findings of fact and imposing a final sentence
inside or outside that range, consistent with constitutional guar-
antees.5
The Court adopted this approach. It decided to eliminate all as-
pects of the Sentencing Reform Act that directed, or even men-
tioned, mandatory application of the Guidelines." Only two provi-
sions fell into this category, in the Court's view: "the provision
that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that
justify a departure), see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),"53' and the provision
that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo
review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range, see [18
U.S.C.] § 3742(e)."41" These excisions, the Court believed, would
50. Id.
51. Id. All of the Justices agreed on this particular point. Id.; see also supra note 48
(noting split majorities in Booker).
52. Id.
53. Section 3553(b)(1) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
[Tihe court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [pre-
scribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines], unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
54. Section 3742(e) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the
sentence -
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons
required by [the Sentencing Reform Act];
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on
a factor that -
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in [the Sentencing Re-
form Act]; or
(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applica-
ble guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be considered in
imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the
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render the Guidelines advisory, freeing the trial judge to impose
any sentence permitted under the United States Code, regardless
of the sentence recommended by the Guidelines.55 This would pre-
sumably remedy the constitutional infirmity of the federal sys-
tem.56
III.
Alas, it was not to be. One provision yet remains that mandates
application of the Guidelines, dooming all resentencing to illegal-
ity. Subsection (g)(2) of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 still requires district
courts, in cases remanded from the courts of appeals, to impose a
sentence within "the applicable guidelines range."57 This places
district courts in the same position they occupied before Booker:
reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the
district court[;] ... or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with re-
spect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due defer-
ence to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With re-
spect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals
shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
55. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-61.
56. Id.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (providing that the district court
must impose a sentence within the Guidelines range for "[cihild crimes and sexual of-
fenses'), declared unconstitutional by United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 117 (2d
Cir. 2005). Another section of the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), contains a
similar prescription, mandating imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range for
controlled substance violations when the district court declines to honor an otherwise ap-
plicable statutory minimum sentence. Id. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
the case of an offense under ... the Controlled Substances Act [or] ... the Controlled Sub-
stances Import and Export Act... the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission... without regard to any statu-
tory minimum sentence. .. ."). However, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), this provision does
not interpose a threshold restriction on the sentencing authority of the judge; rather, it
applies only if the judge first finds that certain mitigating circumstances are present. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (requiring the court to find, inter alia, that the defendant does not have
more than one criminal history point and that the offence did not involve violence or seri-
ous injury). That this statutory constraint arises from post-trial judicial findings, and
serves only to lessen the maximum sentence to which the defendant is otherwise exposed
by the jury's verdict, arguably exempts it from the constitutional concerns underlying
Booker. See, e.g., United States v. De Los Santos, 420 F.3d 10, 13 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005); see
also United States v. Holguin, 436 F.3d 11, 115-19 (2d Cir. 2006) (suggesting, but declining
to expressly hold, that mandatory application of the Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) is
constitutional).
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required to rely on judicial findings of fact under the Guidelines to
determine the bounds of their sentencing authority.
The Supreme Court did not refer to this provision in Booker. No
court of appeals has mentioned the provision in remanding a case
post-Booker, and no district court has identified it in resentencing
a defendant. 8 Indeed, it has been acknowledged only rarely in
judicial opinions and academic literature since its enactment in
2003."9 Subsection (g)(2) seems to have fallen through the cracks.
But its impact cannot be discounted. It renders every sentence
imposed on remand, whether based on Booker or not, illegal.
Subsection (g)(2), like the excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), re-
quires district courts to impose a sentence in compliance with the
Guidelines."' District courts are bound, under this provision, by
the base range established by the Guidelines for the offense of
conviction absent additional findings of fact."' These findings in-
crease the maximum punishment to which the defendant is ex-
posed, but they are to be made by a judge, not a jury.62 As Booker
demonstrates, this process is fundamentally inconsistent with the
constitutional right to a jury trial.63 A sentence imposed on a de-
fendant in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) is illegal under
the Sixth Amendment. 4
58. This conclusion is based on a review of opinions available in the federal reporters
and online databases. There may, of course, be federal judges who recognized the issue in
an unpublished or oral decision.
59. See United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 852-53 (5th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Lynch, 378 F.3d 445, 449 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Riley, 376 F.3d 1160, 1166
(D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Nichols, 376 F.3d 440, 444 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Phipps, 368 F.3d 505, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Gilley v. United States, 543 U.S. 1104 (2005); United States v.. Kostokis, 364 F.3d 45, 53 (2d
Cir. 2004); United States v. Martin, 363 F.3d 25, 36 & n.18 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.
Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329, 344 n.16 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d
218, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Friddle & Sands, supra note 25, at 528-45; Vinegrad, supra
note 24, at 313-14; Peter B. Krupp, The Return of Judicial Discretion: Federal Sentencing
under "Advisory" Guidelines after United States v. Booker, BOSTON B.J., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at
20.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g); see also supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(g)(2)); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); Booker, 543 U.S. at 226, 240.
61. See Andrews, 390 F.3d at 852-53; KIan, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510-12 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also
supra note 45 (quoting provisions requiring judicial findings of fact).
63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-59.
64. See id. To be precise, a Sixth Amendment violation will occur only if the final sen-
tence is actually above the "base" range established by the Guidelines. See id. at 267-68.
However, even sentences imposed within the base range should be considered unlawful, in
light of the district court's obligation to recognize the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(g)(2). See Booker, 543 U.S. at 267-68; United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164-65
(3d Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also United States v. Storer, 413 F.3d 918, 923-24 (8th Cir.
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Unfortunately, the converse is also true: a sentence imposed on
a defendant in compliance with the Sixth Amendment is illegal
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2). A sentence is lawful under Booker
only if the district court recognized that it was not bound by the
recommended Guidelines range and honored its obligation to con-
sider all pertinent information in imposing sentence.' But sub-
section (g)(2) not only requires a district court to impose a sen-
tence within the applicable Guidelines range; it expressly pre-
cludes the court from considering information that was not identi-
fied in the prior proceedings and approved by the court of ap-
peals.' To satisfy the dictates of the Sixth Amendment, the court
must necessarily disregard those of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2).
The district court is caught in a Catch-22. If it follows the Sixth
Amendment, it violates 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2); if it follows 18
U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), it violates the Sixth Amendment. Either way,
the final sentence will be illegal. The only question is whether the
illegality will flow from a statutory or a constitutional violation.
IV.
This obviously leaves the federal judiciary in a bit of a quan-
dary. Districts courts are effectively precluded from issuing legal
sentences on remand. Courts of appeals are faced with an ava-
lanche of cases in which remanded sentences must be remanded
again, only so they can be remanded once more.
The only way out of this spiral is for one level of the federal
courts to declare, as they must, that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) is un-
constitutional. There is no way to reconcile 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2)
with the Sixth Amendment. Like the provisions excised in Booker,
subsection (g)(2) establishes a mandatory Guidelines scheme that
is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of
trial by jury." It must be struck.
2005) (distinguishing between a "constitutional" Booker violation, where the final sentence
is above the base range, and a 'statutory" Booker violation, where the final sentence is
imposed under a mandatory Guidelines regime).
65. Booker, 543 U.S. at 267-86; see also, e.g., United States v. Lake, 419 F.3d 111, 113-
14 (2d Cir. 2005); Davis, 407 F.3d at 164-65.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g) (prohibiting district court from imposing sentence outside of the
Guidelines except upon a ground that 'was specifically and affirmatively included in the
[district court's] written statement of reasons ... in connection with the previous sentenc-
ing of the defendant prior to the appeal" and "was held by the court of appeals, in remand-
ing the case, to be a permissible ground of departure"); see Andrews, 390 F.3d at 852-53;
Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
67. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-61.
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This does not, however, spell reversal for the thousand resen-
tencings that have occurred since Booker.68 Courts of appeals have
long adhered to the principle of harmless error, under which a
mistake will not be grounds for reversal if it had no effect on the
lower court's ultimate decision.69 While this concept has fairly be-
deviled the federal courts in other contexts, 0 it is easy to apply in
this situation: all of these violations are harmless.
The reason for this fortunate result is that federal courts have
universally ignored the command of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2). Nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the courts of appeals, in remanding
judgments for resentencing after Booker, has mentioned the provi-
sion.71 To the contrary, they have instructed district courts to
treat the Guidelines as advisory.72 Predictably, district courts have
responded by resentencing defendants in accordance with the
Sixth Amendment, without reference or adherence to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(g)(2).
73
The resulting statutory violations are always harmless. An ap-
pellate court reviewing the sentence, if a challenge is made under
subsection (g)(2), would be forced to conclude that the statutory
provision fatally conflicts with the constitutional right to a jury
trial.74  The result would be excision of the provision.75  There
would then be no reason for the court to direct a remand, despite
the obvious statutory violation, since the statute would no longer
be in force and the district court properly viewed the Guidelines as
68. A search conducted on February 3, 2005, of the circuit court opinions database in
Westlaw, using the search "we +3 vacate remand reverse /9 remand! /6 re-sentenc! &
Booker & da(2005 2006)," produced 1100 results.
69. See, e.g., Lake, 419 F.3d at 113-14; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
734 (1993); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); cf Booker, 543 U.S. at 268 ("[W]e expect reviewing
courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, [including] ... the harmless-error doctrine.").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 255, 257-60 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Godines, 433 F.3d 68, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Rogers, J., concurring); United
States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (1lth Cir. 2005).
71. E.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 268; Lake, 419 F.3d at 113-14; United States v. Davis, 407
F.3d 162, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also supra note 58 (noting the possibility of
unpublished decisions recognizing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2)).
72. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 267-68; see also, e.g., Lake, 419 F.3d at 113-14; Davis, 407
F.3d at 164-65.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, No. 01-CV-80260-DT, 2005 WL 3447866 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 15 2005); United States v. Hopkins, No. 00-40024-06-SAC, 2005 WL 3610341 (D.
Kan. Dec. 14, 2005); United States v. Paz, 384 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Pa. 2005); United
States v. Roach, No. 00-CR-411, 2005 WL 2035653 (N.D. II. Aug. 27, 2005); United States
v. Shearer, No. 1:01-CR-49, 2005 WL 1676747 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2005); United States v.
Green, No. CR-2-01-072, 2005 WL 1460176 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2005); United States v.
Gabriel, No. Crim. A. 02-216, 2005 WL 1060631 (D.D.C. May 4, 2005).
74. See supra notes 60-64.
75. Cf Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
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advisory in the first instance. The judiciary's ignorance of 18
U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) thus proves its salvation.
The situation would, of course, be quite different if a maverick
district court decided to buck tradition and follow the United
States Code. Once again, the court of appeals would have to con-
clude that subsection (g)(2) must be struck.7 ' However, the district
court would now have issued an unconstitutional sentence, based
on its view that the Guidelines were mandatory. Despite its
laudable attempt to follow congressional command, remand would
be the result." Fortunately, however, there are no cases in which
a district court has taken such a novel path."
V.
Resentencing in the federal system is illegal.8 0 Mandatory appli-
cation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines is required by
18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) but is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment.
There is simply no means by which a district court can impose a
sentence on remand that comports with both the United States
Code and the Constitution.
Yet, there will be no rush to the courthouse by criminal defen-
dants nor a rash of overturned judgments. All of the sentences
imposed after Booker have been premised on an advisory Guide-
lines system, satisfying constitutional requirements.8 The only
error in these decisions is noncompliance with a statutory provi-
76. See supra notes 60-64.
77. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-35, 259-60; see also, e.g., United States v. Lake, 419 F.3d
111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
78. E.g., Lake, 419 F.3d at 113-14.
79. See supra note 58 (noting the possibility of unpublished decisions recognizing 18
U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2)).
80. Technically, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) applies only to resentencings that are conducted
following a remand by a court of appeals on grounds that the original sentence was imposed
in violation of law or incorrect application of the Guidelines. Booker, 43 U.S. at 233-35,
259-60. It would not apply to resentencings conducted by the sentencing court after grant-
ing a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or another motion to resentence addressed to
the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580, 584 (E.D. Tenn.
2005). Nor would it apply when a court of appeals remands a case for a determination of
whether the same sentence would be imposed under an advisory Guidelines scheme, for
purposes of plain-error analysis. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.
2005) (remanding to allow district court to consider resentencing); United States v. Crosby,
397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).
81. This is not to suggest, of course, that district courts have not committed other con-
stitutional errors in resentencing defendants.
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sion, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), that must be excised from the United
States Code. Any violation of this provision is harmless.82
There is thus no real incentive for attorneys, either the prosecu-
tion or the defense, to raise the issue. Nor is there any viable
means by which appellate courts could address it. Issues are gen-
erally waived if not raised by the parties," and, since resolution of
the issue would have no impact on the outcome of the case, courts
of appeals will be understandably reluctant to raise it on their
own initiative.'
The job must fall to the district courts. Sentencing judges must
sua sponte recognize the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(g)(2) and strike it from the United States Code. A ground-
swell of district court resistance to subsection (g)(2) will eventually
find its way into the federal appellate system. Only then will the
remedial whitewash started by Booker be complete.
82. See United States v. Hill, 411 F.3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[Where... a [dlistrict
[clourt clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence
imposed under the Guidelines, any error that may attach to a defendant's sentence under
Booker is harmless."); see also United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (same); United States v. Christopher, 415 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2005) (same);
United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v.
Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399
F.3d 68, 81 (lst Cir. 2005) (same). But cf United States v. Gokey, 437 F.3d 622, 624-26
(7th Cir. 2006) (reversing and remanding case to district court, which had found Guidelines
unconstitutional, when district court refused to consider Guidelines recommended range in
crafting final sentence); United States v. Davila, 418 F.3d 906, 908-10 (8th Cir. 2005)
(same); United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); United States v.
Storer, 413 F.3d 918, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Barnett, 410 F.3d
1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).
83. E.g., United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Hembree, 381 F.3d 1109, 1110 (l1th Cir. 2004); United States v. AI-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564,
571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir. 1997);
United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991).
84. See, e.g., Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that "extraordi-
nary circumstances" may justify consideration of issues not adequately raised, which would
otherwise be deemed abandoned and waived).
